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ABSTRACT 
Intrusion detection has attracted a considerable interest from 
researchers and industries. After many years of research the 
community still faces the problem of building reliable and 
efficient intrusion detection systems (IDS) capable of handling 
large quantities of data with changing patterns in real time 
situations. The Tor network is popular in providing privacy and 
security to end user by anonymising the identity of internet users 
connecting through a series of tunnels and nodes. This work 
focuses on the classification of Tor traffic and nonTor traffic to 
expose the activities within Tor traffic that minimizes the 
protection of users. A study to compare the reliability and 
efficiency of Artificial Neural Network and Support vector 
machine in detecting nonTor traffic in UNB-CIC Tor Network 
Traffic dataset is presented in this paper. The results are analysed 
based on the overall accuracy, detection rate and false positive 
rate of the two algorithms. Experimental results show that both 
algorithms could detect nonTor traffic in the dataset. Artificial 
neural network proved a better classifier than SVM in detecting 
nonTor traffic in UNB-CIC Tor Network Traffic dataset. 
Keywords 
Artificial neural network, support vector machines, 
intrusion detection systems Tor and nonTor, UNB-CIC Tor 
Network Traffic dataset. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The computing world has changed over the past decade due to the 
rapid development of internet and the network systems, network 
and computer systems traffic are susceptible to intrusion and this 
has been a great concern to the research community and 
industries. 
Over the last decade, traffic classification has advanced in its 
applications in systems like quality of service (QoS) tools or 
Security information and Event management(SIEM) [1]. A 
considerable interest have been attracted from researchers and the 
industries to the study of these technologies and developing 
classification techniques [2][1]. 
The Tor networks help to provide privacy and anonymity over the 
internet but have been an obstacle in the classification of internet 
traffic. It operates by anonymising the identity of users connecting 
through a series of tunnels and nodes. Tor networks do not detect 
anomalies in traffic flow and do not have the ability to raise an 
alarm when an anomaly occurs.  
To this effect intrusion detection system (IDS) plays an important 
role in Tor networks. Intrusion  
Detection Systems are placed on the networks and computer 
systems to monitor and detect anomalies. In general IDS can be 
categorised into two components, based on the detection 
technique. Signature based and Outlier based IDS. Most IDs 
employ a signature based detection approach where the network 
traffic is monitored and compared against database rules or 
signature of known anomaly in network traffic [3][4]. An alarm is 
raised on detection of a mismatch. Signature based is the most 
common as they do not necessarily have to learn the network 
traffic’s behaviour. Although it is effective in detecting known 
anomalies, it cannot detect unknown anomalies unless the 
signature and rules are updated with new signatures [5][6]. 
Signature based is known to have a significant time lapse between 
anomaly detection and activation of its corresponding signature 
[4]. Signature based techniques are mainly human-dependent in 
creating, testing and deploying signatures. 
The outlier technique is a behavioural based detection system. It 
observes changes in normal activity of network traffic and builds 
a profile of the network traffic being monitored [7][8]. An alarm 
is raised whenever a deviation from the normal behaviour is 
detected. It has the ability to detect unknown anomalies. However 
outlier detection based IDS have the disadvantage of being 
computational expensive because the profile generated over a 
period needs to be updated against each system activity [9] [4]. 
Machine learning techniques have the ability to learn the normal 
and anomalous patterns automatically by training a dataset to 
predict an anomaly in network traffic. One important 
characteristic defining the effectiveness of machine learning 
techniques is the features extracted from raw data for 
classification and detection. Features are the important 
information extracted from raw data. The underlying factor in 
selecting the best features lies in a trade-off between detection 
accuracy and false alarm rates. The use of all features on the other 
hand will lead to a significant overhead and thus reducing the risk 
of removing important features. Although the importance of 
 
feature selection cannot be overlooked, intuitive understanding of 
the problem is mostly used in the selection of features [10]. A 
study by A.Lashkari et al.[1] Showed Decision Tree C4.5 
classifies Tor and nonTor traffic on UNB-CIC Tor Network 
Traffic dataset [11] with a high precision and recall. In the study 
by [1] ,23 time based features were extracted from the traffic and 
was reduced to 5 for training and testing of the machine learning 
algorithms.  
This paper analyses the performance of Artificial neural network 
(ANN) and Support vector machines (SVM)  in terms of overall 
accuracy in detecting nonTor traffic in a Tor network traffic 
dataset data from the University of New Brunswick (UNB), 
Canadian Institute for cyber security (CIC) using an anomaly 
based approach with all features in the dataset. As part of the 
work, the results are compared with the results of [1] being the 
only study published to the best of our knowledge using the UNB-
CIC Tor Network Traffic dataset. In the proposed approach 10 
features are selected out of the 28 features of the dataset using 
Correlation based feature selection (CFS) for training and testing 
the detection algorithms. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: section 2 describes 
intrusion detection systems, section 3 describes the UNB-CIC Tor 
Network Traffic dataset, section 4  introduces  Artificial neural 
network and Support vector machines algorithms used in the 
experiment respectively, section 5 analysis experimental results, 
conclusion and future works are presented in section VI.  
2. INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEMS 
Intrusion detection system is a software application or a device 
placed at strategic places on a network to monitor and detect 
anomalies in network traffic [12][13] as shown in Figure 1. The 
main features of IDS are to raise an alarm when an anomaly is 
detected. A complementary approach is to take corrective 
measures when anomalies are detected, such an approach is 
referred to as an intrusion Prevention System (IPS) [14]. Based on 
the interactivity property of IDS, it can be designed to work either 
on-line or off-line. On-line IDS operates on a network in real time 
by analysing traffic packets and applying rules to classify normal 
and analogous traffic. Off-line IDS operates by storing data and 
after processing to classify normal and anomaly.  
 
 
Figure 1. Intrusion detection system model 
3. UNB-CIC TOR NETWORK TRAFFIC 
DATASET 
3.1 UNB-CIC tor network traffic dataset 
description 
UNB-CIC Tor Network Traffic dataset [8] is a representative 
dataset of real-world traffic defined as a set of task. Three users 
were set up for browser traffic collection and two users for the 
communication parts such as chat, mail, p2p etc. from more than 
18 representative applications such as Facebook, skype, Spotify, 
Gmail etc. The dataset contains 8 types of Tor traffic as shown in 
table I and non-Tor traffic. The dataset contains 8044 (11.86%) 
records of Tor traffic and 59790 (88.14%) records of nonTor 
traffic.  The non-Tor traffic captured in the dataset contains 
unique characteristics differentiating it from the Tor traffic. These 
characteristics are called features. The UNB-CIC Tor Network 
Traffic dataset contains a total of 28 features listed in tables II. 
The features were generated by a sequence of packets having the 
same values for {source IP, source Port, destination port and 
protocol (TCP and UDP)}. All Tor traffic was TCP since the flow 
does not support UDP. The generation of flows was done by a 
new application, the ISCXFlowMeter which generates 
bidirectional flows [7]. 
Table I. Description of UNB-CIC Tor Network Traffic 
No. Type of Traffic Description 
1 Browsing HTTP and HTTPS traffic generated 
by users while using Firefox and 
chrome 
2 Email Traffic samples generated using a 
Thunderbird client and two other 
accounts holders. Mails were 
delivered through SMTP/S and 
received using POP3/SSL in client 
1 and IMAP/SSL in client 2. 
3 Chat Instant messaging applications were 
identified under the chat label. The 
label was associated with Facebook 
and hangouts through web browser, 
skype and IAM and ICQ using an 
application called pidgin. 
 
4 
 
Audio-
Streaming 
 
Traffic was captured from Spotify 
identifying audio applications that 
require a continuous and steady 
stream of data. 
5 Video-Streaming Traffic was captured from YouTube 
and Vimeo services using Chrome 
and Firefox identifying video 
applications that require a 
continuous and steady stream of 
data. 
6 File Transfer This traffic was generated from 
skype file transfers, FTP over SSH 
(SFTP) and FTP over SSL (FTPS) 
traffic sessions identifying the 
traffic applications sending or 
receiving file documents. 
7 Voice over 
Internet Protocol 
(Voip) 
This is the traffic generated by 
voice applications using Facebook, 
Hangouts and Skype. 
8 Peer-peer (p2p) This label identifies file sharing 
protocols like Bit torrent. The traffic 
was generated by downloading 
different torrent files from the Kali 
Linus distribution and captured 
traffic using Vuze application on 
different combinations of upload 
and download speeds. 
 
Table II. Description of captured features 
 
4. DETECTION ALGORITHMS 
4.1 Artificial Neural Network 
Artificial neural network (ANN) consists of information 
processing elements known to mimic neurons of the brain. 
In this experiment, the neural network which is a Multilayer 
perceptron (MLP) is provided with a set labelled training set 
which learns a mapping from  input features listed in table II  
represented as 𝑥 in Figure 2. to outputs (Tor and NonTor) as 𝑦 in 
Figure 2. given a labelled set of inputs-output pairs 𝑑 = {(𝑥', 𝑦')}'+,-               (4) 
Where, 𝑑 is called the training set and 𝑁 is the number of training 
examples. It is assumed that 𝑦' is a categorical variable from some 
infinite set, 𝑦' ∈ {1…𝐶} [15].The technique used to train the MLP 
neural network is the Back Propagation hence the name MLP-BP. 
The construction of the MLP-BP neural network is by putting 
layers of non-linear elements to form complex hypotheses. Each 
node takes an element of a feature vector. The structure of the 
ANN consists of three layers feed-forward neural network as 
shown in Figure 2. Nodes labelled 𝑥, ……𝑥3 have been used to 
represent the input feature vectors to the ANN.  
 
Figure 2. ANN model used in experiment 
Hidden inner nodes 𝑎, ……𝑎3 make up the hidden layer with an 
output layer of 𝑦,	𝑎𝑛𝑑	𝑦7 nodes denoting different output classes 
(Tor and NonTor). The interconnection between the nodes is 
associated with scalar weights with an initial weight assigned to 
the connection. During training, the weights are adjusted. 
Evaluating the hypotheses is done by setting the input modes in a 
feed-back process and the values are propagated through the 
network to the output. At this stage the gradient descent is used so 
as to push the error in the output node back through the network 
by a back propagation process in order to estimate the error in the 
hidden nodes. The gradient of the cost – function is then 
calculated [16]. 
4.2 Support Vector Machines 
Support Vector Machines (SVM) is a machine learning algorithm 
that learns to classify data using points labelled training examples 
falling into one or two classes. The SVM algorithm builds a 
model that can predict if a new example falls into one category or 
the other [17]. The model is constructed by constructing 𝑘 Models 
of SVM, where 𝑘  denotes the number of classes (Tor and 
NonTor). 𝑥,	𝑎𝑛𝑑	𝑦7 SVM represented as 𝑙th SVM is trained with 
all the examples in the 𝑙th class labelled 1 and the other labelled 0.  
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IP address sending packets from source to 
destination 
Port sending packets from source 
IP address receiving packets from source 
Port receiving packets 
Type of the protocol used, e.g. udp,tcp, etc 
Length of connection in seconds 
Number of data bytes 
Number of data packets 
Packets flow inter arrival time Mean 
Packets flow inter arrival time  
Standard deviation 
Packets flow inter arrival time Max. 
Packets flow inter arrival time Min. 
Forward inter arrival time, the time between 
two packets Sent forward direction Mean. 
Forward inter arrival time, the time between 
two packets sent forward direction Standard 
deviation. 
Forward inter arrival time, the time between 
two packets sent forward direction Max. 
Forward inter arrival time, the time between 
two packets sent forward direction Min. 
Backward inter arrival time, the time 
between two packets sent backward Mean. 
Backward inter arrival time, the time 
between two packets sent backward 
Standard deviation. 
Backward inter arrival time, the time 
between two packets sent backward Max. 
Backward inter arrival time, the time 
between two packets sent backward Min. 
The amount of time a flow was active 
before becoming idle mean. 
The amount of time a flow was active 
before becoming idle Standard deviation. 
The amount of time a flow was active 
before becoming idle Max. 
The amount of time a flow was active 
before becoming idle Min. 
The amount of time a flow was idle before 
becoming active Mean. 
The amount of time a flow was idle before 
becoming active Standard deviation. 
The amount of time a flow was idle before 
becoming active Max. 
The amount of time a flow was idle before 
becoming active Min. 
 
Figure 3. Maximum-margin hyper plane and margins for an 
SVM trained with samples from two classes. 
Where,𝑥' ∈ 𝑅;, 𝑦' ∈ {1,0} ,𝑖 = 1… . . 𝑁 and 𝑦' ∈ {1……𝑘} is a 
class of 𝑥'. Introducing a slack of positive variables	𝜉', that 
measures the extent of constraint in a non-linear situation. The 
prima Optimisation problem becomes [18]: 
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    (𝑤A)Bf (𝑥)' + 𝑏A ≥ 1 − 𝜉'	A ,				𝑖𝑓	𝑦' = 𝑁, 
                          (6) 
    (𝑤A)Bf (𝑥)' + 𝑏A ≤ −1 + 𝜉'A, 𝑖𝑓	𝑦' = 𝑁, 
    𝜉'A ≥ 0, 𝑖 = 1……𝑁, 
Where the training set 𝑥' are mapped into higher dimensional 
space by the function f  and ∁, where ∁ is a parameter which 
trades off wide margin with small number of margin failures . 
Minimisation of   ,7 (𝑤A)B𝑤A implies maximising  7JK  , which is 
the margin between the two data points. The SVM then searches 
for a balance between the regularisation term ,7 (𝑤A)B𝑤A and the 
errors in training the dataset. Solving (6) gives 𝑘 decision 
functions: 𝑤 ,Bf 𝑥 + 𝑏,			 
     ⋮                              
                                   			 𝑤 MBf 𝑥 + 𝑏M       
   
where 𝑥  is the class having the largest value of the decision 
function: 𝑥 ≡ 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥A≡,…M( 𝑤A Bf 𝑥 + 𝑏A)       (7) 
The dual problem of (6) having the same number of variables as 
the number of data in (6). Thus 𝑘		𝑁-variable quadratic 
programming problems are solved. 
5. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS ANALYSIS 
5.1 Results Evaluation Metrics 
The effectiveness of IDS requires high accuracy, high detection 
rate (Recall) and high Positive Predictive value (Precision) as well 
as low false positive rate. The performance of IDS in general is 
evaluated in terms of overall accuracy, detection rate and false 
positive rate. The confusion metrics shown in table III is used to 
evaluate these parameters. 
 
Table III. Confusion Metrics 
Predicted Class 
Tor traffic Nontor traffic  
Actual Class Tor traffic TN FP 
Nontor traffic FN TP 
 
Accuracy (ACC)= BRBRSB-STRST- 
Detection Rate (DR)= BRBRSTR 
False Positive rate (FPR)= TRTRSB- 
Positive Predictive Value (PPV)= 	 BRBRSTR 
Where, True Negative (TN): a measure of the number of normal 
events rightly classified normal. 
True Positive (TP): a measure of attacks classified rightly as 
attack. 
False Positive (FP): a measure of normal events misclassified as 
attacks. 
False Negative (FN): a measure of attacks misclassified as 
normal. 
5.2 Feature Selection 
This paper proposes correlation based feature selection (CFS) to 
select the relevant features out of the 28 features.  
The CFS is an algorithm that is a heuristic evaluating with an 
appropriate correlation measure. A good set of features are highly 
correlated with the target (class) and at the same time uncorrelated 
to each other. The CFS algorithm reduces the dimensionality of 
the dataset, reduces overfitting and gives a shorter training time.  
Table IV shows the 10 selected features based on the appropriate 
correlation measure and heuristic search strategy. 
 
Table IV. CFS features selection 
No. Feature Name No. Feature Name 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Destination Port 
Bwd IAT Mean 
Idle Max 
Fwd IAT Min 
Source Port 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
Idle Min 
Flow Bytes/s 
Flow IAT Std 
Source IP 
Destination IP 
 
5.3 Experimental Results 
Neural network and Support vector machine classification 
involves two phases: the classification phase and training phase as 
shown in Figure 4. In the training phase, the algorithm learns the 
distribution of the features with corresponding classes. During the 
classification phase, the learned model is applied to a test set 
which has not been previously seen by the training phase. 
 
Figure 4. Experimental Model 
 
 
In this work, experiment was performed by training ANN and 
SVM with UNB-CIC Tor Network Traffic dataset to detect 
nonTor Traffic. 
In the first set of experiment, ANN was trained with all 28 
features of the dataset with 20-hidden neurons and with 10 
features selected using CFS with 6-hidden nodes. The ANN uses 
Levenberg-Marquardt training function (trainlm) for learning. 
In the second set of the experiment SVM was trained with all 28 
features in the dataset and with 10 features selected using CFS. 
The performance of ANN and SVM was evaluated on train (70%) 
dataset, test (15%) dataset and validation 20% dataset.  
 Figure 5 shows the results after training ANN and SVM with all 
28 features and 10 features selected by CFS. A.Lashkari et al.[1] 
Proposed C 4.5 in classifying Tor Traffic and nonTor Traffic 
using only the time based features of the dataset.  
 
 
Figure 5 Experimental results of SVM and ANN 
 
Table V. Experimental results compared to A.Lashkari et 
al.[1] 
DETECTION ALGORITHM 
PERFORMANCE ANN CFS-
ANN 
SVM CFS-
SVM 
C4.5 
[1] 
DR (Tor) % 93.7 98.8 67 98.4 93.4 
FPR (Tor) % 0.21 0.03 2.3 1.8 - 
PPV (Tor) % 98.3 99.8 79 80 94.8 
DR (nonTor) % 99.2 100 98 99 99.2 
FPR (nonTor) % 1.6 1.2 32.8 2.6 - 
PPV(nonTor) % 99.8 99.8 96 88 99.4 
Overall ACC. % 99.1 99.8 94 88.1 - 
 
The experimental results as compared to the  results in [1] show 
CFS-ANN performs with an overall accuracy of 99.8% in the 
classification of Tor and nonTor using only 10 features in the 
dataset. On the other hand the DR for Tor and nonTor Traffic in 
CFS-ANN recorded 98.9% and 100% respectively which 
performed better than C 4.5. The best values in detection 
accuracy, detection rate with a low false positive rate in the 
classification of Tor and nonTor traffic were recorded by CFS-
ANN making it a promising detection system for nonTor traffic. 
A comparison of experimental results with results from [1] are 
shown in table V. 
6. Conclusions 
This paper presents experimental study using two algorithms to 
detect nonTor traffic in UNB-CIC Tor Network Traffic dataset. 
The research mainly focuses on detecting nonTor traffic in a 
representative dataset of real-world traffic to expose the activities 
within the Tor-traffic that downgrades the privacy of users. The 
work proposes CFS-ANN hybrid classifier in the detection of 
nonTor traffic in UNB-CIC Tor Network Traffic dataset. 
Experimental results show the proposed algorithm detects nonTor 
with an accuracy of 99.8%, detection rate of 100% and false 
positive rate of 1.2%. The proposed algorithm performed better 
than SVM and C4.5 proposed in [1] as shown in table IV. The 
proposed hybrid classifier reduces the dimensionality of the data 
size by 65% removing the less effective features thereby lowering 
computational cost and training time.  
In the future, the performance of the proposed algorithm and deep 
neural networks will be analysed in the classification of the 8 
different types of traffic in the UNB-CIC Tor Network Traffic 
dataset. 
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